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The EU’s identity is said to shape its role as a ‘normative actor’ promoting universal 
democratic values, including to its neighbourhood. Yet a competing civilizationist version of 
European identity – increasingly invoked on the radical right – frames Europe as representing 
‘Judeo-Christian’ values in opposition to non-European cultures, especially Islam. This paper 
argues that these identity variations shape divergent responses to foreign policy challenges, 
by showing the growing influence of civilizationist discourse on European attitudes towards 
the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The paper focuses on Austria’s 2017-2019 ÖVP-FPÖ coalition 
to identity links between rising civilizationist politics and significant policy shifts regarding 
the Israeli-Palestinian arena. 
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Judeo-Christian civilizationism: challenging common European foreign policy in the 
Israeli-Palestinian arena   
Introduction 
This article contributes to the study of how the rise of populism affects the foreign policy of 
the EU and its members. It considers in particular the impact of rising, radical civilizationist 
interpretations of European identity on the EU's capacity to pursue a unified foreign policy in 
the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Though no wider generalizations can be affirmed solely from 
the singular case study presented, it suggests how civilizational identity politics may 
undermine any normative consensus about the EU's identity and broader international role. 
Whilst EU institutions assert a ‘secular-liberal’ European identity based on religious 
neutrality (Wolff, 2018, p. 171), this conception of Europe is increasingly challenged. 
Analysing divides over European identity, Risse differentiates between an ‘EU Europe … 
embracing modern, democratic, and humanistic values’ and a rival conception of ‘a Europe 
of white Christian peoples that sees itself as a distinct civilization’ (Risse, 2010, p. 6).  
I refer to this latter version as ‘civilizationism’, and emphasise how the concept of ‘Judeo-
Christian’ is increasingly invoked interchangeably with ‘Christian’ on the populist radical 
right, when referring to the cultural common ground of European peoples. I argue that 
variations in identity construction shape variations in national role conception and foreign 
policy preferences among member states, inhibiting the unanimity required to harmonize 
diplomatic action.  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long tested EU foreign policy capacity. In the EU Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC) member states span a spectrum of positions shaped by interests, and 
historically and culturally driven identity variations. Simultaneously a transnational split sees 
centre-right parties typically more sympathetic to Israel, and left leaning parties to the 
Palestinians.  
Divergences have been repeatedly exposed in recent years, exacerbated by the collapse of the 
peace process and the dominance of the Israeli right, the support provided to Netanyahu by 
the Trump administration, and Israel’s growing significance as a strategic ally for some 
(Greene and Rynhold, 2018). But they have also been exacerbated, I argue, by a growing 
transnational identity cleavage between ‘civilizational’ and ‘universal’ Europe.  
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Drawing on role theory, I argue that civilizationist identity politics prompts role conceptions 
that vary from those defined by EU treaties: less a global mission promoting human rights 
and rule of law, and more a mission to defend Europe’s civilizational heritage from Islamic 
threats. Those adopting this world view increasingly include Jews within Europe’s cultural 
boundaries and identify Israel as Europe’s front line. 
I begin by presenting theoretical context on the significance of identity in EU foreign policy, 
as well as the broader relationship between identity and foreign policy as described by role 
theory. I then give an account of the rise of Judeo-Christian civilizationism in European 
political culture, before describing its growing role in framing the Israeli-Palestinian arena. In 
order to explore more deeply the relationship between civilizationist identity and policy 
preferences of individual states, I then present the case of Austria’s 2017-2019 coalition 
between the Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the radical right 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), drawing on original in-depth interviews with senior officials and 
experts. The conclusion considers the implications for EU foreign policy beyond the Israeli-
Palestinian arena.  
Europe’s global role in question 
It is widely recognised that the EU’s aspiration to be a significant international actor is 
compromised by enduring divergences among member states.  
The creation of the High Representative and the European External Action Service reflected 
the aspiration of members for a stronger capacity to advance shared goals defined in EU 
treaties, including: encouraging regional cooperation and integration; promoting human 
rights, democracy and governance; and preventing conflicts (Smith, 2014, p. 2). The 
motivation for common foreign policy has various drivers. Economic integration necessarily 
drives integration of trade and other economic policies. Regarding diplomatic or military 
tools, the logic of scale implies that EU members are more effective in unison. The normative 
dimensions of EU goals stem from the EU’s institutional role pacifying a Europe shattered by 
extreme nationalism and a desire to promote its successful model regionally and 
internationally; and from European states’ strengths as civilian rather than military powers.  
Constructivist approaches to European integration emphasise that a common foreign policy 
not only projects EU preferences and norms externally, but is ‘an important practice of 
European identity construction’ (Diez, 2005). Conversely, the lack of a strong shared 
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European identity is an underlying weakness in formulating effective common foreign policy 
(Hill & Wallace, 1996).  
The intergovernmental method, and especially the Council of the EU, remains dominant in 
the use of diplomatic and military tools governed by the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Individual members retain effective veto over collective action, making the study of 
foreign policy attitudes within states enduringly relevant to EU foreign policy. The treaties 
aspire to ‘an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States action’ but members 
ultimately retain sovereignty over foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 158). 
Differences are rooted not only in divergences of interests, but national identity and political 
culture. The Europeanization of member state foreign policies – in the sense of 
‘downloading’ a harmonized world view and agenda is uneven, especially with expanded 
membership (Tonra, 2015).  
EU difficulties pursuing a unified normative foreign policy have been sharpened by 
increasing internal security, economic and legitimacy challenges, and an increasingly volatile 
neighbourhood. The dream of the ‘Arab Spring’ advancing democracy became a nightmare 
with the destabilisation of the region. Following the associated wave of uncontrolled 
migration, and Jihadist attacks in European cities, the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy emphasised 
the precedence of stability over democracy in Middle East policy (Roccu & Voltolini, 2018). 
Yet I argue here that these difficulties have catalysed another challenge to EU foreign policy 
unity: the proliferation of a European identity discourse that challenges the universalist 
concept of liberal values underpinning ‘normative power Europe’.  
Role theorists persuasively argue that ‘role concepts provide us with an analytical and 
operational link between identity constructions and patterns of foreign policy behaviour’ 
(Aggestam, 2004). According to March and Olsen (1998, p. 952), political actors are 
constituted by a subtle interplay between ‘interests, by which they evaluate their expected 
consequences’, and ‘rules embedded in their identities and political institutions.’ National 
role conceptions guide policy makers by providing patterns for internationally and 
domestically expected and appropriate responses to events. 
Role conceptions are influenced by the expectations of other international actors’, including 
institutions. Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011, p. 254) attribute to EU institutions the capacity 
to socialise members to behave in line with the expectations of its normative agenda. 
According to Aggestam (2004, p. 91), ‘The stability of the EU as a foreign policy actor … is 
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dependent on the member states modifying their behaviour according to each others’ roles 
and expectations.’  
However, role conceptions can vary between constituencies within a society (Cantir & 
Kaarbo 2016; Breuning, 2011). They are also subject to constant reconstruction, catalysed by 
changes in structural conditions and leadership, and the presence of crisis (Gustavsson, 
1999). Nabers (2011, p. 87) describes how competing discourses can contend ‘to become the 
leading interpretative structure’ within a society.  
I argue that civilizationism challenges the EU normative consensus by representing a rival 
interpretative structure, framing Europe less as representing a universal, secular liberal creed 
to be promoted globally, and more as the bastion of a unique cultural heritage, to be defended 
from non-European cultures, especially Islam. As this alternative framing of European 
identity gains ground, it undermines the EU’s capacity to socialise its members.  
The rise of ‘Judeo-Christian civilizationism’ in Europe 
Petito and Bettiza (2018) explain the prevalence of civilizational discourses guiding 
international actions as a consequence of globalization and associated uncertainties, which 
catalyse culturally focussed identity politics. Post-essentialist approaches to civilizational 
identity are ‘sceptical of essentialist claims about civilizations … but sensitive to the power 
that such claims exercise in social and political practice’ (Hall & Jackson, 2007, p. 4). They 
reject Huntington’s (1996) claim that civilizations have relatively fixed characteristics, 
emphasising civilizations’ internal contestations, only loose integration, and constant change. 
Katzenstein (2010, p. 12) argues that ‘Making civilizations primordial is a political project 
that aims at creating a taken-for-granted sense of reality that helps in distinguishing between 
self and other and right and wrong.’  
The civilizationist dimension in European political discourse has been increasing, including 
reference to the role of religion in shaping European political culture (Brubaker, 2017). The 
early 2000s debate about referring to Christianity or Judeo-Christianity in the EU constitution 
reflected an underlying tension. The decision against, along with Turkey becoming a 
candidate country despite strong opposition, symbolised the resilience of a norm that the EU 
was not defined by a particular faith or civilization. 
The Barcelona ‘Euromed’ Process launched in 1995 was similarly premised on rejecting the 
Huntingtonian ‘Clash of Civilizations’. It reflected not only the aspiration to expand free 
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trade, but faith in the universality of the EU’s values, and the enriching potential of cultural 
dialogue (De Perini, 2019). After 9/11, Europeans continued trying to frame ‘the 
Mediterranean’ as a geopolitical region transcending Western and Islamic Worlds (Adler, 
Bicchi, Crawford, & Del Sarto, 2006). 
This agenda has been undermined by a backlash against globalization, integration, and 
migration, exacerbated by the rising Jihadist threat, as well as the great recession. Radical 
right parties have risen, characterised by nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 
2007). In Western Europe they have pulled centre-right conservative parties in their direction 
(Bale, 2003). Economic stagnation exacerbated transnational divides between the 
beneficiaries of globalization who identify as ‘European’, and those who feel disadvantaged, 
and seek the state’s protection from globalization (Fligstein, 2008).   
International concerns are important to radical right populists, especially globalization, de-
nationalization, and immigration (Liang, 2007). Significant foreign policy orientations span 
many populist right parties, including support for sovereign nationalism and skepticism 
towards global governance and intervention. (Chryssogelos, 2017; Stengel, MacDonald, & 
Nabers, 2019; Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017) 
An increasingly prominent unifying cry is the supposed Islamic threat to Europe’s ‘Western 
Judeo-Christian humanist culture’ (Zuquete, 2008). Whilst images of Islam as antithetical to 
Europe run deep, this current political agenda developed in the 1990s, as Europeans grappled 
with integrating growing, settled Muslim minorities (Betz, 2007). Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn was a progenitor of a political agenda which casts ‘backward’ Islam as a threat to 
superior Western, secular modernity, rooted uniquely in Judaism, Christianity and humanism 
(Kluveld, 2016). Today a wider array of European ‘Alarmists’ warn that Islamic culture 
threatens European integrity (Joppke, 2014). This trend developed in parallel with a growing 
anti-Islamic theme among US Evangelicals and Conservatives, spurred in the 1980s and 
1990s by the Iranian revolution and Jihadist threats culminating in 9/11 (Gerges, 1999). The 
notion of Islamic threat played a significant role in the 2016 Trump campaign.  
Civilizationist discourses position the populist right as the defender not only of the nation but 
the wider civilization, against Islamic threats to its security, and no less importantly to its 
values. Mainstream political elites are accused of exposing Europe to ‘Islamization’ through 
multi-culturalism, migration and Turkish accession (Marzouki & McDonnell, 2016). This 
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ferment was accelerated by the wave of uncontrolled migration in 2015 and Merkel’s 
decision to absorb new arrivals.   
Until quite recently, anti-Semitism remained a common feature of the European populist 
radical right, alongside anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism (Liang, 2007, p. 25). Whilst it 
remains conspicuous in far-right parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in 
Hungary, as anti-Islamic politics has evolved, a swathe of radical right parties have switched 
to expressing solidarity with Jews. As Brubaker (2017, p. 1202) has observed, where once the 
Jew was considered the threat to the ethnocultural integrity of the nation, ‘in the broader 
comparative civilizational perspective of the new populism, Jews are redefined as fellow 
Europeans and as exemplary victims of the threat from Islam’. This redefinition of Jews as 
fellow Europeans serves the radical right a double purpose: constructing European identity in 
a manner that emphasises the exclusion of Muslims as the anti-European (and anti-Semitic) 
other; whilst distancing them from their own unattractive, anti-Semitic origins or associations 
(Hafez, 2014).  
For the radical right, adopting ‘Judeo-Christian’ discourse in referring to the common cultural 
ground of Europe serves this agenda. There is broad awareness that, beginning in the 1990s, 
parts of the populist right increasingly invoked Europe’s Christian roots in their objections to 
Muslim immigration. Hurd (2008) has astutely described the significance of what she calls 
‘Judeo-Christian secularism’ – the notion that a Judeo-Christian tradition is the unique 
grounding for Western secularism – in implying that other cultures, and especially Islam, are 
inhospitable for democracy. But the specific political role of the ‘Judeo’ prefix has been less 
considered. 
It is beyond our scope to assess the claim that a coherent set of Judeo-Christian values forms 
the consensus ground of Western political culture, suffice to say that ‘Judeo-Christian’ is far 
from an obvious and uncontroversial category. Where the label has gained currency, it has 
been more due to political utility than philosophical content. References to ‘Judeo-Christian’ 
grounding of Western liberal values by politicians developed in the US around World War II. 
The political intent was to include Jews in a shared civic identity, in contrast to anti-Semitic 
and godless European ideologies of Fascism and Communism (Strote, 2016). For the 
contemporary radical right in Europe the use has changed: the Judeo-Christian formula 
conveys that Judaism is part of a supposed, authentic European culture in a way that Islam, 
which by definition is not.  
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Marine Le Pen declared in 2014: ‘That a new religion has increasing demands that collide 
with the … the ways of life … of a country … founded on Judeo-Christian values, that’s a 
problem.’ (Alduy, 2014) Nigel Farage responded to the January 2015 Paris attacks in the 
European Parliament by calling on Europeans to ‘be a lot braver and a lot more courageous in 
standing up for our Judeo-Christian culture.’ The AfD’s 2016 manifesto declares its 
opposition to ‘Islamic practice which is directed against our liberal-democratic constitutional 
order, our laws, and the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations of our culture.’   
In post-Communist Europe, populist-nationalism is different. Victor Orban frames ‘Christian 
Democracy’ as a defence of ‘Christian’ family values against secular libertarianism. Until 
recently, with no significant Muslim minorities, anti-Islamic rhetoric was hardly relevant. But 
since 2015 Orban has similarly reinforced his European Christian rhetoric with anti-Muslim 
layers, and talk of Europe’s Christian roots morphs into talk of Jewish and Christian roots 
when contextually appropriate. When opening a reconstructed synagogue in Serbia in 2018, 
Orban referred to ‘Europe which rests on the Jewish and Christian heritage,’ and to ‘regions 
to the south and east of us where our Jewish and Christian brothers and sisters are being 
persecuted’ (Orban, 2018).  
Having described the emergence of Judeo-Christian civilizationism in Europe, the next 
section highlights how this form of identity politics relates to the Israeli-Palestinian arena.  
Judeo-Christian civilizationism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
In the expansive literature on the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian arena (Martins, 2015b), some 
key themes stand out. The issue has long tested the EU’s ability to formulate a unified foreign 
policy (Musu, 2010). European attitudes are shaped by complex overlapping historical 
legacies, including Europe’s Jewish question; colonialism; support for Israel in its early 
years; and – increasingly since 1967 – a leading role promoting Palestinian national rights 
and more recently Palestinian statehood.  
EU diplomatic and bottom up support for Palestinian statehood are taken to illustrate both the 
EU’s normative foreign policy ambition and potential (Bouris, 2014), but also its limitations 
(Pace, 2009). Widely noted is that Israel’s exceptional integration with the EEA has advanced 
despite increasing EU frustration at Israeli policies in the Palestinian arena (Pardo & Peters, 
2010). Despite widespread concerns that Israeli policies, especially settlement construction, 
breach international law, compromise Palestinian rights, and undermine a two-state solution, 
there has been insufficient unity to apply conditionality to the deepening of EU-Israel 
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relations in line with the 1995 Association Agreement and 2004 Action Plan. Trade 
agreements were signed covering agriculture in 2009 and pharmaceuticals in 2012, and a 
major aviation agreement in 2013.  
States seeking a tougher line have helped ensure no EU-Israel Association Council has been 
held since 2012 to further advance bilateral ties. But since 2012, when the FAC declared that 
EU agreements must explicitly apply only to Israel’s pre-1967 borders, there have also been 
no substantial Council measures to increase pressure over settlements. Attempts to expand 
the policy of differentiation between Israel and the Occupied Territories in ways that might 
harm Israeli businesses and banks were blocked in 2016 by supporters of Israel’s government 
in the FAC, including Greece and Hungary (Lovatt, 2016).  
Nor has there been enough unity to extend recognition to Palestine, despite several national 
parliaments and the European parliament backing it. Some states have consequently taken 
unilateral initiatives, such as Sweden’s recognition of Palestine, and France’s international 
conference to promote peace talks in 2017. 
The differences between member states have been repeatedly exposed in UN General 
Assembly votes, defying the CFSP aspiration to a ‘common approach’ within international 
organizations (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 303). In the 2012 vote on upgrading 
Palestine’s UN status to a non-member state, 14 EU members voted for, 12 abstained, and 
one opposed.  
The Israeli-Palestinian issue has long spread EU members on a spectrum of positions, with 
divergences driven by interests, identity and domestic politics. Geopolitics is significant for 
France, as the leader of Mediterranean members promoting ties with southern neighbours and 
attempting to insert the EU into regional diplomacy (Bicchi, 2007). But ‘like-minded’ pro-
Palestinian states also include Ireland and Sweden, whose political culture shapes a concern 
for international law and human-rights.   
Meanwhile Holocaust responsibility is defining for Germany, and to a lesser extent Austria, 
and influential for other states whose Jewish communities were destroyed. The UK has 
tended to a balanced position, shaped by historic ties to Arab states, but also its relationship 
with Washington, and resistance to French competition with US diplomacy. Atlanticism is 
also significant for former Communist states, including Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland. These now form the core of ‘like-minded states’ blocking increased pressure on 
Israel, even while concerns about anti-Semitism endure (Greene & Rynhold, 2018). Israel’s 
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rising economic, military and technological capability, and Mediterranean energy resources, 
have made it an increasingly significant strategic ally for some – including Cyprus and 
Greece, with concerns about Erdogan’s Turkey (Tziarras, 2016).  
Aside from these national characteristics, Israel’s own complex and contested identity has 
long engendered polarised perceptions in the West (Del Sarto, 2003; Greene, 2013). Whilst 
there is a broad consensus that both Jews and Palestinian have a legitimate right to self-
determination, there is a significant right-left split. The right displays a greater tendency to 
identify with Israel not only as a legitimate expression of Jewish emancipation, and as a 
strategic ally against radical anti-Western forces, but as an outpost of Western democracy. By 
contrast, to the further left, there is a greater tendency to identity with Palestinian nationalism 
as an anti-colonial or anti-hegemonic movement, and view Israel as a racist ethnocracy, 
abuser of Palestinian rights, or agent of US neoimperialism.  
Yet this picture of European attitudes needs updating in the light of rising civilizational 
politics. Before anti-Islamic politics became central for radical right parties, the dominant 
tendency in this party family was towards anti-Semitic anti-Zionism. Common tropes 
included conspiracy theories blaming Israel or global Jewry for manipulating US policy and 
global events, and attempts to discredit Israel with accusations of brutality (Liang, 2007, pp. 
23–27). 
Gradually however this has been displaced by pro-Zionism framed by Judeo-Christian 
civilizationism. A notable milestone came in 2010, when several European populist right 
leaders visited Israel, including then-FPÖ leader Hans Christian Strache, and representatives 
of Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, the Swedish Democrats, and the short-lived German Freedom 
Party (Hafez, 2014). There they issued the ‘Jerusalem Declaration’, asserting their 
commitment to ‘the canon and values of Western civilization, based on the spiritual heritage 
of Greco-Roman antiquity, Judeo-Christian cultural values, humanism and the 
enlightenment,’ which was threatened by ‘fundamentalist Islam’. They asserted that ‘Israel is 
the only real democracy in the Middle East’ and affirmed the ‘right of Israel to self-defence 
… against Islamic terror.’ (“Jerusalemer Erklärung,” 2010) 
This framing has adherents too in European centre-right parties. Also in 2010, former 
Spanish PM Jose Maria Aznar launched a Friends of Israel initiative backed by various 
retired politicians, whose manifesto declared: ‘The assault on Israel is itself an assault on 
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Judeo-Christian values. Israel stands on the front line, but we are next in line.’ (“Stand for 
Israel, Stand for the West,” 2010) 
Together these two documents distil the central features of the Judeo-Christian civilizationist 
framing of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In summary: Western values are rooted in a supposed 
‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition and are threatened by the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. In 
that context, Israel is a civilizational kin state to Europe and the West, and indeed the frontier 
state of the Judeo-Christian world. Regional rejection of Israel is not because of its 
illegitimacy as a Western colonial imposition, or because of its actions, but because of its 
Western values. This Arab-Islamic rejectionism, and not the occupation, is the root of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By extension, Palestinian or Arab violence against Israel is not an 
expression of justified grievance, but inspired by anti-Western religious extremism. 
Therefore, the Jihadist threat to European security is analogous to, or on a continuum with, 
the threat posed to Israel by Islamist extremists. By the same token, pressuring Israel into 
territorial concessions or criticising its security policies is capitulation or appeasement in the 
face of Jihadist threats. It also has direct implications for Western security. Firstly, the misuse 
of ‘human rights’ claims and international legal tools by Israel’s enemies to undermine its 
sovereign right to self-defence will similarly be used to delegitimise the security policies of 
other Western states. Secondly, Israel is a vital regional ally in containing global Jihadist 
movements, and weakening Israel undermines Europe’s own security.  
This narrative is particularly conspicuous when radical right politician address Israeli, Jewish, 
or US conservative audiences. Geert Wilders declared in a visit to Israel in 2010: ‘Your 
country is the cradle of Western civilization. We call it the Judeo-Christian civilization with 
good reason’ (Wilders, 2010). Czech president Milos Zeman declared in Israel in 2017: ‘We 
are currently facing a major migration crisis associated with terrorism … an incompatible 
culture of hatred is threatening the fundamental values of Judeo-Christian European culture 
… Israel and its heroism is an inspiration for us’ (Beck, 2017).  Italian Lega Deputy Prime 
Minister Matteo Salvini declared in Jerusalem: ‘Whoever wants peace needs to support 
Israel’ (Ahren, 2018). Polish Law and Justice figurehead Jarosław Kaczyński described Israel 
in 2017 as the ‘frontier embassy of our [Western] civilization … the most humane civilization 
that has ever existed’ (Adekoya, 2018). 
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This framing resonates with the dominant claims of the Israeli right, that the root of the 
conflict is Islamic extremism and Palestinian rejection of Jewish rights, to which the 
occupation is peripheral.  
The admiration for Israel is no doubt aided by the perception of the country as an 
economically successful, ethnically rooted and militaristic sovereign state, capable of using 
force to defend itself, and unencumbered by EU membership.  
But does this framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in civilizationist terms impact policy 
preferences among EU governments? In the following section I assess the case of Austria, 
which saw in December 2017 the formation of a coalition between the conservative ÖVP  
and radical right FPÖ. Austria is an apt case for several reasons. Firstly, the shift from a 
centrist SPÖ-ÖVP coalition under an SPÖ Chancellor, to an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition under an 
ÖVP Chancellor, allows an evaluation of the significance of party-political change. The 
material factors – economic and security ties; geography; demography – all remained fixed, 
but the decision makers changed along with the parties, constituencies and ideologies they 
represent. Secondly, the FPÖ, as one of the most long-standing radical right parties in 
Europe, with notable anti-Semitic roots, exemplifies the adoption of Judeo-Christian 
civilizationism as anti-Islamic politics has gained prominence. The fact that it served in a 
similar coalition in the early 2000s provides a point of comparison to evaluate change on the 
radical right over this period. Whilst the generalizable conclusions to be drawn from a single 
case study are limited, the case highlights issues which can be explored in future studies 
incorporating more cases. 
The case study provides a general background to Austrian foreign policy identity and role, 
and factors shaping attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian arena, before evaluating how 
Austrian policy orientations were impacted by the new coalition. The case study then goes 
beyond the existing public record by presenting new evidence on the motivations of the 
actors from in-depth interviews conducted by the author with senior officials and politicians 
directly involved. These include coalition foreign minister Karin Kneissl, Austrian 
ambassador to Israel Martin Weiss, and ÖVP parliamentarian and Jewish community member 
Martin Engelberg. 
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The Austrian case 
Though Austria has no especially pronounced interest in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, as with 
every EU member, it has its nexus of ideational and interest based factors shaping its 
orientation.  
Austria’s foreign policy has evolved in phases since 1945. The end of occupation in 1955 was 
premised on its commitment to neutrality. Under the influence of Bruno Kreisky as SPÖ 
foreign minister (1959-1966) and chancellor (1970-1983), Austria played mediator between 
the US-led West and Soviet East. Kreisky extended Austria’s ‘active neutrality’ to the Middle 
East, including as an early advocate for PLO recognition (Secher, 1994). This left a legacy 
for Austrian diplomats and the SPÖ of a supportive attitude towards Palestinian aspirations. 
Kreisky – despite Jewish origins – also typified Austrian resistance to share responsibility for 
Nazi crimes. He engaged in angry clashes with Austrian Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal, who 
exposed the war records of his cabinet members.  
In the 1980s Austrians re-examined their past. Their national narrative as ‘first victims’ of 
Nazism was reconsidered, triggered by the 1986 controversy over presidential candidate Kurt 
Waldheim’s war record (Pelinka, 1998, p. 192). The affair put new scrutiny on Austria’s past, 
but also exposed enduring anti-Semitic attitudes (Reiter, 2013). In 1993, Chancellor Franz 
Vranitzky acknowledged Austrian co-responsibility for the Holocaust, including during a 
visit to Israel.   
Joining the EU in 1995 reinforced the decline of Austria’s ‘active neutrality’ concept shaping 
its foreign policy role conception. With some exceptions (notably the Balkans) Austria 
shifted to relative disinterest and anonymity, as it acquiesced to integration of its global role 
with the multilateral structures of the EU, dominated by larger states. Two decades after 
accession, Muller and Maurer (2016) wrote that, ‘Austria has displayed little interest to 
develop an active foreign policy profile.’  
The entry of the FPÖ under Jörg Haider into a coalition led by ÖVP Chancellor Wolfgang 
Schüssel in 2000 temporarily added notoriety to Austria’s profile. The coalition shocked 
other EU members, triggering temporary sanctions, and further detracting from Austria’s 
international influence. The FPÖ was founded by former Nazi officers in the 1950s, and 
rooted in pan-German nationalism with its attendant anti-Semitism. Haider, the son of Nazis, 
was reluctant to condemn his parents’ generation (W. C. Müller, 2000, p. 198).  
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Haider’s participation in the Austrian government led to the withdrawal of Israel’s 
ambassador. Under Haider, FPÖ foreign policy swung from opposing neutrality and 
supporting NATO during the Cold War, to anti-Americanism after the Cold War 
(Chryssogelos, 2015). The dominant trend in the early 2000s was anti-American and anti-
Zionist. Haider showed fascination for Saddam Hussein, visiting him twice in 2002. In the 
FPÖ-aligned Aula magazine, Israel and the Jews were accused of acting like Nazis towards 
Palestinians, of controlling the US, and of causing terrorism (Virchow, 2007). A 2008 FPÖ 
party document condemned: ‘the aggressive repressive politics of Israel against the 
Palestinians’ (Meret, 2010, p. 207). In June 2010, the FPÖ backed a resolution in the Vienna 
City Council condemning Israel over the interdiction of the Mavi Marmara (Weinthal, 2010). 
How does this compare to the FPÖ during the 2017-2019 coalition? By 2017 the party had 
undergone a stark U-turn. Austria has been increasingly impacted by rising anti-Islamic, anti-
immigration, and anti-integration sentiment, on which the FPÖ has capitalised. Already in 
1997, the FPÖ, traditionally anti-clerical, inserted references in its programme to 
Christianity’s importance in Western values (Luther, 2010). Strache, who led the party from 
2005 had initially opposed this (Hadj-Abdou, 2016, p. 35). However, as leader he embraced 
religious symbolism amid growing public concern at the expanding Muslim minority, 
famously brandishing a cross whilst demonstrating against construction of a mosque (Wodak, 
2015, p. 140). He also publicly denounced anti-Semitism, though this endeavour was harmed 
by anti-Semitic incidences among activists, including an anti-Semitic cartoon posted on 
Facebook by Strache himself in 2012 (Stoegner, 2016). 
In the context of his efforts to detoxify his party, in late 2010 Strache signalled a sharp shift 
on Israel, by participating in the visit that generated the aforementioned ‘Jerusalem 
Declaration’. He visited Israel again in 2016, and declared: ‘I always say, if one defines the 
Judeo-Christian West, then Israel represents a kind of border. If Israel fails, Europe fails. And 
if Europe fails, Israel fails’ (Baker, 2016). Undeterred by the Netanyahu government 
maintaining its non-contact policy with the FPÖ, Strache, still in opposition, wrote to 
Netanyahu in 2017 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Jerusalem’s reunification. He 
committed to ‘take upon myself to do all in my power … to move the Austrian Embassy … 
to Jerusalem’, and declared: ‘the State of Israel possess the right to build wherever is required 
in the Land of Israel.’ (Ahren, 2017) 
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His coalition partner, ÖVP Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, also positioned himself as warm 
towards Israel as foreign minister (2013-2017), and had several meetings with Netanyahu. 
Kurz, born in the early 1980s and socialised in the period of Austria’s re-examination of its 
past, tended to frame support for Israel in terms of Austria’s moral responsibility for Israeli 
and Jewish welfare.  
At the same time, ÖVP is a centre-right party rooted in Catholicism and conservatism. Kurz 
found electoral success in 2017 by talking tough on immigration (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018). 
Kurz also highlighted his Catholic faith, and engaged in civilizationist discourse during his 
campaign and subsequently, declaring: ‘We have a culture shaped by our Judeo-Christian 
heritage and the Enlightenment – and this culture needs protecting, especially at a time of 
high and rising immigration’ (Johnson, 2017). 
How did this coalition shape Austrian policy in the Israeli-Palestinian arena? After the 
formation of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in December 2017, the low-profile approach to foreign 
affairs gave way to new assertiveness. In December 2018 Austria was one of eleven EU 
members to reject the UN Global Compact on Migration, despite the Commission having 
played an active role in promoting the project and its human rights centred approach, in line 
with the EU’s normative agenda (Apap, Diaz, & Trevino, 2019).   
An equally conspicuous shift was evident in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The previous SPÖ -
ÖVP coalition expressed responsibility for Jewish and Israeli welfare, but when faced with 
EU divisions on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, leant towards Palestinian preferences. On 
upgrading Palestine to a non-member state in the UN in 2012, Austria was one of 14 EU 
members to vote in favour. Austria was one of 13 states in 2013, and 16 states in 2015, to 
sign a letter calling on the EU High Representative to issue guidance on labelling goods from 
Israeli settlements (Ravid, 2015). 
The new coalition brought a significant shift. On his first day in office Kurz met the Israeli 
Ambassador in Vienna and told her he respected the Israeli government decision not to 
engage with FPÖ ministers (Landau, 2017). The ÖVP-FPÖ government then unusually 
included in the government program a direct commitment to Israel ‘as a Jewish state’ and ‘a 
peaceful solution in the Middle East, with particular attention to the security interests of 
Israel.’ (Zusammen. Für unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017 – 2022, 2017). These 
are formulations that, according to Austrian ambassador to Israel Martin Weiss, ‘no other 
government has used and would have used.’ Weiss added, ‘It was meant as a political signal 
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because of the presence of FPÖ in the coalition, but it also shows that both parties could 
agree on Israel’ (M. Weiss, personal communication, June 20, 2018). 
In a February 2018 meeting in Jerusalem, Kurz not only reiterated Austria’s ‘special 
responsibility towards Israel and the Jewish people’ and promised to ‘raise awareness in 
Europe for … the special security needs of Israel’, but also promised Netanyahu a shift in 
Austria’s UN voting, and backing for Israel’s Security Council candidacy (Landau, 2018).  
Just three days after the ÖVP-FPÖ government was formed in December 2017, Austria had 
voted with 22 out of 28 EU member states to condemn the US recognition of Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital. However, according to Ambassador Weiss, ‘It was in the very early stages of 
the government, and if there had been more time to look at it, it might have been that we 
would have landed on the side of the six [EU members that abstained from the resolution].’ 
(M. Weiss, personal communication, June 13, 2018). In May 2018, Austria signified this shift 
and moved decisively out of the EU mainstream, by being one of just four EU member states 
to send representation to the opening of the new embassy, alongside the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania. This was an illustration of individual member state positions 
undermining the EU’s capacity to unify its diplomatic stance.  
Then, for the first time in a split EU vote in UNGA, also in May 2018, on a resolution 
condemning Israeli actions on the Israel-Gaza border resulting in Gazan civilians deaths, 
Austria leant towards Israeli preferences and abstained (as one of 16 EU members including 
Germany), rather than voting yes with France.  
Ambassador Weiss, when asked how he would position Austria in the spectrum of positions 
on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, replied: 
We used to be towards the left of that spectrum, closer to Palestinian concerns and 
more critical of the Israeli position. I think we moved towards the middle of this 
group and with this new government we moved towards the right, meaning more 
understanding of Israeli actions, and not really willing to give Israel constant advice 
about how they should run their affairs (M. Weiss, personal communication, June 13, 
2018). 
The shift in orientation that came with the new coalition is therefore clear. But what explains 
it? Those involved in the coalition policy give explanations with resonate with elements of 
the civilizationist world view.  
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Martin Engelberg, a member of the Austrian Jewish community recruited by Kurz as an ÖVP 
candidate, who accompanied the Chancellor on his 2018 visit to Israel, highlighted the 
contrast between Kurz and German Chancellor Angela Merkel: 
Chancellor Kurz is … part of a new generation of politicians – I call it the post 
Merkel era. The Merkel era is where Germany finally regained some moral 
rehabilitation with letting refugees in. The post-Merkel era is being more realistic 
about the problems we brought in here, and the future of Europe, and really keeping 
these Western Judeo-Christian values. If you heard the statements of prime minister 
Netanyahu and the Chancellor, we are speaking about establishing a strategic 
relationship between not only Israel and Austria but between Israel and the Union (M. 
Engelberg, personal communication, June 20, 2018). 
Ambassador Weiss, when asked to explain this shift, pointed to the long term significance of 
the younger generation accepting Austrian co-responsibility for the Holocaust and not 
influenced by the anti-Semitic attitudes. But he then identified 2015 as a turning point.  
More than 1.5m refugees crossed Austrian territory and the government was basically 
throwing up their hands and saying ‘well there is nothing we can do’ there was a 
feeling of total loss of control … which is part of the reason why we have the 
government we have now. Because they were taking the line: ‘We have to be strong, 
we have to protect our borders, if need be force will have to be applied.’ And in that 
context Israel also looks much better because you say, ‘Look how they protect their 
border’. We had a number of Austrian politicians who came to Israel and went to the 
Sinai to see how you build a decent fence (M. Weiss, personal communication, June 
13, 2018). 
The political crisis affecting the region also highlighted the strategic significance of Israel as 
a prop of stability for its Arab neighbours threatened by Islamist extremism. According to 
Weiss, ‘Israel would say “listen guys if tomorrow Egypt goes down in a violent domestic 
clash, where do you think the political refugees will go … they would rather go to Europe. So 
if we help Egypt, it is not only good for Israel, but it’s also good for you guys.” And I think 
people buy that argument’ (M. Weiss, personal communication, June 13, 2018). 
The coalition’s foreign minister was Karin Kneissl, an academic with specialist knowledge of 
the Middle East, nominated by (though not a member of) the FPÖ. When asked what 
trajectory she saw in attitudes towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian arena, she responded: 
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The year 2015 was a watershed line … when we had this massive immigration from 
Middle East; when we had a rise in terror attacks in Europe … I would say the overall 
perception of Israel and how Israel is dealing with Hamas for instance, has changed 
… And this is something that is encapsulated … in how certain politicians in Austria 
see Israel, as a role model. How do you handle terrorism and how do you continue 
normal life despite terrorist threats … I would say there was a growing understanding 
(K. Kneissl, personal communication, June 22, 2018). 
Opponents and analysts outside the coalition interpreted the support for the Israeli 
government policy in more instrumentalist terms. Opposition SPÖ Nationalrat member and 
development affairs spokesperson Petra Bayr, dismissed the government’s pro-Israel policy 
as ‘blue washing’ – showing warmth to Israel to address suspicions of anti-Semitism. 
According to Bayr this is primarily to communicate to a domestic audience the message that: 
‘they will not say any anti-Semitic or anti-Israel things so don’t worry’ (P. Bayr, personal 
communication, June 19, 2018). 
Leading Austrian political historian Oliver Rathkolb viewed the political audience to be not 
only domestic but also European. It reflects according to Rathkolb, a ‘learning process’ from 
the difficult experience of Schüssel in 2000. The need of Kurz and Strache to address 
concerns about the FPÖ remains relevant against the backdrop of recurring incidences of 
anti-Semitism among its ranks (Stoegner, 2016). According to Rathkolb, ‘[Kurz] wants a 
clear statement to both the EU and the Austrian public that … the Austrian government is not 
moving back in history, and vice chancellor Strache is doing the same.’ (O. Rathkolb, 
personal communication, June 20, 2018). 
In sum, what does this evidence tell us? Austria’s shift to a more supportive position toward 
Israel is a long-term trend rooted in changes in Austrian political culture that began in the 
1980s with acknowledging co-responsibility for the Holocaust and a much greater sensitivity 
to anti-Semitism. From the late 1990s the FPÖ adopted religio-cultural symbolism as it 
focussed on opposition to the growing Muslim minority, though under Haider, the party 
remained hostile to Israel. As Strache sought to detoxify the party domestically and 
internationally, he made an abrupt shift in around 2010 to transform FPÖ from an anti-Zionist 
to a pro-Israel party, and picked up the burgeoning notion of Europe as ‘Judeo-Christian’ in 
his pro-Israel rhetoric.  
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This created an alignment with his conservative coalition partner Kurz, who was committed 
to Austrian moral responsibility for Israel’s welfare and keen to avoid the opprobrium that 
faced the Schüssel-Haider government; and simultaneously ready to confront the EU 
mainstream on migration and talk up the Judeo-Christian cultural roots of Europe. 
Austrian attitudes towards Israel were also impacted by changes in the Middle East. The post-
Arab Spring destabilization, which triggered uncontrolled migration through Austria, 
reinforced the image of Israel as a model and ally in the struggle with Islamist extremist 
violence, and increasingly important prop of stability for Egypt and Jordan in particular. 
However, whilst that crisis peaked in 2015, it was the 2017 formation of the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalition that marked a shift in Austrian diplomatic alignment. In explaining the shift, there is 
no simple way to disentangle identity, interests and rhetoric. The shifting role conception of 
Austria, in the context of the increasing tendency to identity Europe in terms of supposed 
Judeo-Christian values threatened by Islam, is interwoven with a complex set of domestic and 
international political motivations. What can be said is that for the FPÖ in particular, the 
notion of Europe as a ‘Judeo-Christian civilization’  provided a rhetorical and conceptual 
framework for their swing from the anti-Zionism evident under Haider’s leadership, to 
fervent support for the Netanyahu government under Strache.  
Conclusion 
The adoption of religious imagery and language by many populist radical right parties to 
emphasise a civilizational divide with Islam, has converged with an agenda to detoxify 
themselves from anti-Semitic associations, leading to increasing references to Europe as 
‘Judeo-Christian’. In this rhetorical and cognitive framing of Europe’s identity, Israel is 
depicted as the frontier state of Western Judeo-Christian civilization.  
The abruptness of this turn on the radical right, as illustrated in the Austrian case, implies not 
a deep philosophical reconsideration of Judaism’s contribution to European culture, but rather 
the political utility of the shift. The morphing between references to the ‘Christian’ roots of 
Europe to the ‘Judeo-Christian’ roots offers a powerful illustration of the how civilizational 
identities, far from being primordial, mould around political agendas.  
Whilst the focus here has been on the Judeo-Christian construction and the Israeli-Palestinian 
arena, attention should be paid to how civilizationist discourses shape an alternative 
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conception European identity and role, and the significance for EU foreign policy more 
broadly. 
As civilizationist identity becomes embossed in the patterns of discourse and cognitive 
framing of leaders on the European right, it challenges the EU’s dominant universalist and 
human rights centred identity and role conception. This latter approach will not be easily 
displaced, being deeply embedded in EU institutions and treaties. However, the stronger the 
presence of the civilizationist rival, the more it will inhibit the EU’s ability to download its 
normative agenda, and shape a unified foreign policy among its members.  
To point to another example, in responding to the Syrian civil war, radical right parties have 
consistently criticised the mainstream approach of isolating Assad on human rights grounds. 
They have called instead to align with Assad and his Russian backers in the fight against 
Islamic extremism, and to stabilise the sovereign Syrian government in order to prevent mass 
migration, and ultimately to facilitate the return of migrants who threaten both European 
security and cultural identity.  
To understand diverging foreign policy preferences among EU members we must examine 
not only the shifting nexus of interests, world views and political identities of each set of 
decision makers, but also the increasing significance of civilizationist interpretations of 
European identity. This insight prompts further case study research in a range of countries 
and variety of issues into the extent to which contrasting conceptions of European identity 
produce competing role conceptions, and impact the quest for a unified European foreign 
policy. 
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